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Abstract 
Many macroeconomists and policymakers have debated the effectiveness of the 
quantitative monetary-easing policy (QMEP) that was introduced in Japan in 2001. 
This paper measures the effect of the QMEP on aggregate output and prices, and 
examines its transmission mechanism, based on the vector autoregressive (VAR) 
methodology. To ascertain the transmission mechanism, we include several financial 
market variables in the VAR system. The results show that the QMEP increased 
aggregate output through the stock price channel. This evidence suggests that further 
injection of base money is effective even when short-term nominal interest rates are at 
zero.  
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1. Introduction 
During the period from March 2001 to March 2006, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
conducted quantitative monetary-easing policy (QMEP) to overcome a long-lasting 
economic slump and deflationary pressures. This policy is an unconventional one, in 
that the BOJ continued to inject ample liquidity into the economy, even though 
short-term nominal interest rates were almost zero. Did such a massive monetary 
injection stimulate real economic activity and prices? If so, what was the transmission 
mechanism through which it had an impact? To address these two questions, this paper 
assesses the effect of the QMEP using the vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology. 
Measuring the effect of the QMEP implemented in Japan is of great significance for 
the following two reasons. First, nobody can claim that the recent Japanese experience, 
or the situation where short-term nominal interest rates hit the zero lower bound, will 
never happen again in any country in the future. Understanding the effect of the QMEP 
in Japan, which is one of the possible strategies at zero interest rates, will be helpful if 
such a situation should occur somewhere in the world.1  
Second, there is controversy as to whether expanding monetary base is effective when 
short-term nominal interest rates fall to zero. According to the traditional IS-LM model, 
an increase in money supply has no effect if the interest rate is at its lower bound, 
because money and bonds are perfect substitutes (that is, a liquidity trap happens in 
this case). Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) also show the ineffectiveness of the QMEP 
by analyzing a dynamic general equilibrium model. On the other hand, Bernanke and 
Reinhart (2004), Bernanke et al. (2004) and Clouse et al. (2003) argue that, even when 
                                                  
1 For alternative strategies at zero interest rates, see, e.g., Bernanke and Reinhart 
(2004), Bernanke et al. (2004), Clouse et al. (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), 
Goodfriend (2000), Jung et al. (2005), McCallum (2000), and Svensson (2001, 2003). 
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short-term nominal interest rates are at zero, increases in monetary base might be 
effective through the portfolio rebalancing effect and the signaling effect (we will 
explain these two effects in the next section). This paper will contribute to such 
arguments by empirically analyzing the Japanese experience in 2001–2006, which 
provides a good opportunity to examine the impact of the further injection of liquidity at 
zero interest rates. 
In this paper, we first estimate a minimal VAR model, which consists only of output, 
prices, and the monetary policy instrument. This examination provides a preliminary 
assessment about the effect of the QMEP on the two key macroeconomic variables, 
aggregate output and prices. The estimation result shows that a quantitative-easing 
shock increases output, but it has little effect on the price level.  
This result raises the question of the transmission mechanism through which the 
QMEP affected the output level. If the QMEP worked through the portfolio rebalancing 
effect or the signaling effect, financial market variables would play an important role in 
transmitting these effects. Therefore, we next add each of several financial variables to 
the above three-variable VAR to investigate the transmission mechanism of the QMEP. 
The financial variables we consider are short- to long-term nominal interest rates, stock 
prices, foreign exchange rates, and bank lending. From these four-variable VAR 
estimations, we find that the QMEP was effective through the stock price channel. 
Furthermore, in order to check the robustness of the stock price channel, we control 
for the effects of several factors that the above four-variable VARs do not incorporate. 
The following four factors are considered: increases in the BOJ’s outright purchase of 
long-term government bonds; introduction of the BOJ’s purchase of stocks held by the 
commercial banks; large increases in the value of exports; and large decreases in the 
 2
outstanding amount of nonperforming loans (NPLs) of the banking sector. They might 
have some effects on the economy, independent of increases in monetary base. Therefore, 
we include each of these four factors in the VAR model to control for their possible 
effects. The estimation results show that the stock price channel is robust even if we 
control for these effects.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
QMEP, discusses the possible effects of the QMEP, and surveys the related empirical 
literature. Section 3 explains our VAR models, identification strategy and data. Section 
4 reports the estimation results for the three- and four-variable VARs. Section 5 
estimates alternative VAR specifications that control for the effects of the 
above-mentioned four factors. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. Background 
2.1. Overview of the QMEP 
Even though the BOJ kept lowering the call rate during the 1990s and eventually 
adopted the zero-interest-rate policy in February 1999, the Japanese economy could not 
escape from the prolonged stagnation and deflationary pressures that occurred from the 
bursting of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s.2,3 In March 2001, the BOJ 
introduced the QMEP to create a further monetary-easing environment under the 
situation where the call rate was almost zero. The BOJ changed its operating target 
                                                  
2 The call rate is a short-term interbank rate, like the federal funds rate in the United 
States. The BOJ has used the uncollateralized overnight call rate as a policy instrument 
except for the QMEP period.  
3 In August 2000, the BOJ terminated the zero-interest-rate policy with the judgment 
that deflationary pressures receded due to the economic recovery, and it raised the call 
rate to 0.25. However, faced with the worldwide decline in the demand for IT goods and 
the subsequent deterioration in Japan’s economy, the BOJ lowered the call rate to 0.15 
in February 2001.  
 3
from the call rate to the current account balances (CABs) held at the BOJ, and it 
continued to inject ample liquidity into the CABs beyond the level needed to maintain 
the call rates at zero. 4  The target level of the CABs was publicly announced 
immediately after every monetary policy meeting. Table 1 describes dates of policy 
changes (the left column) and announced targets of the CABs (the middle column). The 
CAB target increased eight times from 5 trillion yen at the introduction of the QMEP to 
30–35 trillion yen in January 2004.  
[Table 1 around here] 
At first, the BOJ promised that it would continue the QMEP until the year-on-year 
rate of change in the consumer price index excluding perishables (core CPI) became 
stably zero or above. Then, in October 2003, the BOJ provided a more detailed 
description of the commitment: it would maintain the QMEP until (1) not only the most 
recently published core CPI inflation became zero or above, but also such tendency was 
confirmed over a few months, and (2) the future core CPI inflation was not be expected 
to register below zero percent.5 Since October 2005, core CPI inflation rates have been 
zero or positive, which satisfied the first condition in the commitment statement. 
Furthermore, the BOJ judged that future inflation rates would remain positive due to a 
recent steady economic recovery, which satisfied the second condition in the 
commitment statement. Under this environment, the BOJ terminated five years of the 
QMEP in March 2006. 
 
                                                  
4 The CABs include not only reserve balances but also deposits of other financial 
institutions (e.g. securities companies) that are not subject to the Reserve Requirement 
System. 
5 The BOJ also stated that these two conditions were the necessary condition and that, 
even if these two conditions were fulfilled, it might maintain the QMEP depending on 
the economic situation.  
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2.2. Possible Effects of the QMEP and Related Empirical Literature 
There are some empirical studies measuring the effect of the QMEP in Japan. 
Bernanke et al. (2004), Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), and Oda and Ueda (2005) show 
that the QMEP was effective in shifting the yield curve downward. In particular, Okina 
and Shiratsuka (2004) and Oda and Ueda (2005) find that this downward shift of the 
yield curve was caused by the policy-duration effect.6 The policy-duration effect means 
that the central bank’s commitment to keeping the policy rate at zero can stabilize 
market expectations for the path of short-term interest rates and hence reduce 
long-term interest rates. Therefore, their findings suggest that the QMEP worked 
through the commitment to maintaining the zero-interest-rate policy. 
Measuring only the policy-duration effect, however, is not enough to understand the 
effects of the QMEP completely. In the QMEP period, the BOJ had provided abundant 
money by increasing the CAB target several times, even though short-term nominal 
interest rates were already at the zero lower bound. As discussed in Bernanke and 
Reinhart (2004), Bernanke et al. (2004), and Clouse et al. (2003), such further 
expansions of base money might have an impact on economic activity through the 
portfolio rebalancing effect and the signaling effect.  
The portfolio rebalancing effect stems from the assumption that there are several 
assets that are imperfect substitutes for each other. Even if short-term securities and 
money are perfect substitutes because of a zero short-term interest rate, money and 
other assets may be imperfect substitutes. Then, the additional supply of base money 
will cause investors to try to change their portfolios. This portfolio rebalancing will, in 
                                                  
6 Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002), Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), and Oda and Ueda (2005) 
also show evidence of the presence of the policy-duration effect for the period of the 
zero-interest-rate policy (from February 1999 to August 2000). 
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turn, raise prices (or reduce yields) of the assets, thereby stimulating economic activity. 
The idea of the portfolio rebalancing effect is based on the classic literature such as 
Brunner and Meltzer (1963) and Tobin (1969), in which multiasset models were used for 
the analysis of monetary policy. Although the portfolio rebalancing effect might occur 
even in normal times when nominal interest rates are positive, it would be more 
important in the low-interest-rate period such as the recent Japanese case because the 
liquidity effect would diminish or disappear under such a situation.7 
The signaling effect occurs if an increase in monetary base reinforces the signal about 
the central bank’s intention of keeping short-term interest rates at zero. In this case, 
the QMEP can stabilize public expectations of the future paths of short-term interest 
rates and thereby decrease longer-term interest rates. The lower interest rates will, in 
turn, provide stimulus to economic activity. Note that the signaling effect plays a role in 
enhancing the policy-duration effect by increasing monetary base at zero interest rates.  
The empirical literature investigating the effect of the further injection of monetary 
base under a zero-interest-rate environment includes Oda and Ueda (2005), Kimura 
and Small (2004), Kimura et al. (2002), and Fujiwara (2006). Oda and Ueda (2005) and 
Kimura and Small (2004) limit their research to the effect on financial markets. Oda 
and Ueda (2005) find that the expansion of the CABs was effective in lowering medium- 
to long-term yields of Japanese government bonds through the signaling effect. Kimura 
and Small (2004) provide evidence that the expansion of the CABs caused lower yields 
on high-grade corporate bonds through the portfolio rebalancing effect, while it had the 
adverse effects of lowering stock prices and raising yields on low-grade corporate bonds. 
However, these two studies do not measure the effect on macroeconomic variables.  
                                                  
7 When the central bank supplies money to the private sector, the nominal interest rate 
declines. This effect is called “liquidity effect” in this paper.  
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Based on the VAR approach, Kimura et al. (2002) and Fujiwara (2006) examine the 
effect of increases in base money on the two key macroeconomic variables: aggregate 
output and prices. They show that an expansion of base money at zero interest rates 
only slightly increases the output and price levels, suggesting little evidence for the 
effectiveness of the QMEP. However, there are two problems in these articles. The first 
problem is that they include the pre-QMEP period as a part of the sample period. Their 
sample period is 1985Q3–2002Q1 in Kimura et al. (2002) and 1985M1–2003M12 in 
Fujiwara (2006), where Q and M denote quarterly and monthly frequencies of data, 
respectively. Containing the pre-QMEP period would lead to the misleading result 
because the QMEP is a different regime from the earlier monetary policy, in that the 
BOJ’s operating target is changed from the call rate to the CABs. In addition, it is only 
in the QMEP period that the BOJ provided abundant money even at zero interest rates, 
suggesting that the pre-QMEP period contains less information about the effectiveness 
of increases in base money under a zero-interest-rate environment. To avoid these 
issues, Kimura et al. (2002) estimate a VAR with time-varying coefficients (a Bayesian 
VAR) and Fujiwara (2006) adopts a Markov switching VAR method. In spite of these 
efforts, using only the implementation period of the QMEP seems to be the most 
appropriate approach for the investigation of the impact of additional money at zero 
interest rates. 
The second problem in Kimura et al. (2002) and Fujiwara (2006) is that they do not 
sufficiently examine the transmission mechanism of the QMEP. Other than the 
macroeconomic variables of prices, output, and the policy instrument, no variable is 
included in Kimura et al. (2002) and only the yield on 10-year government bonds is 
included in Fujiwara (2006). If the QMEP was effective through the portfolio 
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rebalancing effect or the signaling effect, then financial market variables would play an 
important role in transmitting these effects. In this paper, we examine the transmission 
mechanism of the QMEP more carefully and comprehensively by including several 
financial variables in the VAR model.8 
 
3. VAR Model, Identification, and Data 
Here we estimate two types of the VAR model to assess the effect of the QMEP. The 
first model is a minimal one that includes only output, prices, and the monetary policy 
instrument. This three-variable VAR provides a preliminary evaluation of the impact of 
a quantitative-easing shock on the two key macroeconomic variables, aggregate output 
and prices. As will be seen later, the estimated impulse response functions show that a 
quantitative-easing shock generates persistent increases in the output level.  
However, its transmission mechanism is still unclear from the estimation of the 
three-variable VAR. To find out the transmission mechanism, we next estimate several 
four-variable VARs, each of which includes one of financial market variables as well as 
the above three variables. The financial variables we consider are short- to long-term 
nominal interest rates, stock prices, foreign exchange rates, and bank lending. 9  
Through the portfolio rebalancing effect or the signaling effect, the QMEP might lower 
nominal interest rates, raise stock prices, or depreciate the yen, all of which would 
stimulate economic activity. In addition, commercial banks might increase their loans 
                                                  
8 Other literature studying the impact of the QMEP (but written in Japanese) includes 
Sadahiro (2005, Chapter 9), Kamada and Sugo (2006), and Yamasawa (2006). These 
studies also have the two problems of the other articles we have mentioned. 
9 There is little VAR literature studying the impact of the Japanese monetary policy on 
financial markets even for the period when short-term nominal interest rates are 
positive. Braun and Shioji (2006) investigate the relationship between monetary policy 
and the yield curve. Miyao (2000) includes foreign exchange rates in the VAR system 
while Miyao (2002) uses stock prices. 
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based on the additional money obtained by transactions with the BOJ in its open 
market operations. For these reasons, we adopt these financial variables as possible 
transmitting variables, and add them one-by-one to the VAR model.  
The lag length is set equal to two months for all VAR models, which is selected based 
on the Akaike information criterion for the baseline three-variable VAR (the maximum 
lag length is set equal to six months).10 
To identify monetary policy shocks, we use a recursive strategy (that is, the Cholesky 
decomposition). This is the simplest identification scheme and hence has been used in 
several studies in the VAR literature. As described in the previous section, this paper is 
the first attempt to deal with the whole QMEP period and to investigate the 
transmission mechanism comprehensively. Thus, it seems to be plausible to employ this 
widely used identification strategy for our VAR models. For the three-variable VAR, we 
place the variables in order of output, prices, and the monetary policy instrument. This 
ordering assumes that the BOJ sees current output and prices when it sets the policy 
instrument, but that output and prices only respond to a policy shock with one lag. For 
the four-variable VAR, each financial variable is ordered last, implying that financial 
markets respond to a policy shock with no lag.11 This ordering is essentially the same as 
Christiano et al. (1996), Edelberg and Marshall (1996), Evans and Marshall (1998), and 
Thorbecke (1997), which place the VAR variables in order of macroeconomic variables, 
monetary policy variables, and financial variables. 
                                                  
10 Using alternative lag lengths of one, three, and six months did not essentially change 
the results, but impulse response functions with six lags showed jagged shapes, 
suggesting that the number of parameters to be estimated is too large relative to the 
number of observations.  
11 We obtained similar results even when four-variable VARs were estimated with 
alternative six orderings, (P, Y, M, F), (Y, P, F, M), (M, Y, P, F), (M, F, Y, P), (F, Y, P, M), 
and (F, M, Y, P), where P, Y, M, F denote prices, output, the monetary policy instrument, 
and a financial variable, respectively.  
 9
The frequency of our data is monthly and the sample period is from March 2001 to 
February 2006.12 The measure of output is the index of industrial production (IIP). The 
measure of prices is the core CPI, which is the most crucial variable in the BOJ’s 
commitment statement to maintain the QMEP. As the measure of the monetary policy 
instrument, we use the BOJ’s target of the CABs. See the right column in Table 1 for 
values of the CAB target variable. When the announced target of the CABs is a range 
rather than a level (six cases out of nine policy changes), we take a middle point of the 
range as a value of the CAB target variable. For the period from September 2001 to 
November 2001 when the announced target of the CABs is “above 6 trillion yen”, we use 
the monthly average of the actual daily CABs (8 trillion yen in September 2001, 8.7 
trillion yen in October 2001, and 9.3 trillion yen in November 2001).13 We also use the 
monthly average of the actual daily CABs for the period before March 2001, which serve 
as the initial data for the VAR estimation (4.8 trillion yen in January 2001 and 4.3 
trillion yen in February 2001). Our data of nominal interest rates are the London 
Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR) with maturities of 1, 3, 6, and 12 months and the 
swap rates with maturities of 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 years. The measures of stock prices, 
foreign exchange rates, and bank lending are, respectively, the Nikkei Stock Average, 
the real effective exchange rate, and the total amount of loans and discounts of all 
banks.14 All data except for nominal interest rates are transformed in logarithm and 
                                                  
12 We exclude March 2006 from the sample period because the QMEP was implemented 
for only a short time in this month (it terminated on March 9, 2006). 
13 The daily data of the CABs are obtained from the Financial QUEST of Nikkei 
Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS).  
14 We checked the robustness of our results to the use of alternative measures, which 
include the actual level of the CABs, yields on 10-year government bonds, the Tokyo 
Stock Price Index (TOPIX), real stock prices (deflated by core CPI for both Nikkei Stock 
Average and TOPIX), nominal effective exchange rates, and real bank lending (deflated 
by core CPI). Even when we estimated the VARs using them one-by-one instead of a 
baseline measure, we obtained similar results.  
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multiplied by 100. 15  More detailed information about the data is provided in the 
appendix. Finally, Figure 1 displays the time series of the data used in this paper. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. A Three-variable VAR 
We first estimate the simplest three-variable VAR that consists of IIP, core CPI, and 
the CAB target. Figure 2 displays all estimated impulse responses to a 
one-standard-deviation shock to each variable. The first to third columns represent the 
dynamic responses of the three variables to an IIP shock, a CPI shock, and a 
quantitative-easing shock, respectively. The solid lines represent the point estimates of 
impulse response functions, and the dotted lines denote plus and minus 
two-standard-error bands computed by Monte Carlo simulation with 500 repetitions. 
[Figure 2 around here] 
There are three interesting points to be noted in Figure 2. First, a quantitative-easing 
shock generates persistent increases in output. In response to a quantitative-easing 
shock, IIP begins to increase from the second month and then peaks at the eighth 
month (the response of IIP at the first month is negative, but very small and 
insignificant). Notably, the positive response of IIP is statistically different from zero at 
the seventh and eighth months. In the next subsection, we will examine the 
transmission mechanism through which the policy shock increases the output level. 
Second, the response of core CPI to a quantitative-easing shock is very small and not 
statistically different from zero throughout the period. Although the BOJ introduced the 
                                                  
15 We estimate the VAR in levels, since it yields consistent estimates even if each 
variable is nonstationary (see Hamilton (1994, pp. 651–653)). 
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QMEP in order to escape from deflationary environment, we cannot see the statistical 
evidence that it succeeded in raising general prices. Third, the CAB target increases 
(decreases) in response to a negative (positive) core CPI shock, while it hardly reacts to 
an IIP shock, implying that the BOJ placed more emphasis on prices rather than output. 
This result is consistent with the BOJ’s commitment statement, in which the two 
necessary conditions to terminate the QMEP refer only to the recent and expected 
future rates of inflation, but do not refer to real economic activity. 
 
4.2. Transmission Mechanism 
Although we have found that the QMEP was effective in increasing the output level, 
the transmission mechanism is still an open question. We here investigate the 
transmission mechanism by estimating several four-variable VARs, each of which 
includes one of financial market variables.   
[Figure 3 around here] 
Figure 3 displays the dynamic response of each financial variable to a 
quantitative-easing shock. Charts A to I present the estimated dynamic responses of 
nominal interest rates with various maturities and Charts J to L provide those of stock 
prices, foreign exchange rates, and bank lending, respectively. First note that 
standard-error bands become extremely wide from a certain period in most charts. This 
would be due to a small number of observations relative to the large number of 
parameters to be estimated in the four-variable VAR. Nonetheless, standard-error 
bands appear to be relatively narrow for the early period (within about a year after a 
policy shock). Therefore, we will focus our discussion on the short-run effect of the policy 
shock. 
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The most notable result in Figure 3 is that a quantitative-easing shock raises stock 
prices persistently (see Chart J). The positive response of stock prices is statistically 
different from zero for between the second and eighth months. Hence, it is likely that 
the QMEP was effective through the stock price channel (we will later report all 
impulse response functions for the four-variable VAR with stock prices included and 
discuss the existence of the stock price channel). On the other hand, Charts A to I show 
that nominal interest rates do not decline in response to a quantitative-easing shock 
(only the 1-month rate declines in the first two months, but the effect is very small and 
insignificant). Rather, positive responses are observed for long-term interest rates, and 
the longer the maturity is, the larger the positive response is. In Chart K, a 
quantitative-easing shock depreciates the yen (note that declines in effective exchange 
rates imply the depreciation of the yen). However, the depreciation is not statistically 
significant throughout the period. In Chart L, bank lending decreases rather than 
increases in response to a quantitative-easing shock. 
Summarizing these results, a quantitative-easing shock significantly raises stock 
prices and slightly depreciates the yen, both of which would stimulate economic activity, 
while the policy shock raises nominal interest rates and decreases bank lending, which 
provide no stimulus. 16  These results suggest that the portfolio rebalancing effect 
                                                  
16  The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications started to release the 
2005-base CPI from August 2006, instead of the 2000-base CPI. The 2005-base CPI 
surprised markets due to a large downward revision of the CPI inflation rate for July 
2006. The differences between the two measures also seem to be large for the QMEP 
period. For example, the inflation rate for February 2006 computed from the 2000-base 
(seasonally adjusted) core CPI is 0.6 percent, but that computed from the 2005-base is 
0.0 percent. When we used the 2005-base core CPI in the VAR estimation, instead of the 
2000-base, we obtained different results in that a quantitative-easing shock persistently 
lowered nominal interest rates with the 3-year and shorter maturities and it 
persistently appreciated the yen. However, we rely on the results based on the 
2000-base core CPI, because the BOJ and market participants perceived it as a true 
measure of general prices for the QMEP period and they behaved based on it (for 
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dominates both the liquidity effect and the signaling effect for the QMEP period, 
because if the liquidity effect or the signaling effect occurs, nominal interest rates would 
decline in response to a quantitative-easing shock. Based on the idea of the portfolio 
rebalancing effect, we can interpret the estimation results as follows. With additional 
money from the BOJ, investors (including banks) intended to decrease an 
interest-bearing asset component (including bank lending) in their portfolios, increase 
an equity component considerably, and increase a foreign asset component slightly. 
Such investors’ behavior can be explained by the Japanese financial market conditions 
for the QMEP period: the yields (prices) of interest-bearing assets were near zero (at 
very high levels); stock prices were at the lowest levels since the late 1980s; domestic 
financial assets yielded lower returns than foreign assets; and the banking sector 
suffered from the NPL problem. Under these circumstances, investors might feel that 
holding interest-bearing assets had a higher risk than holding equities or foreign assets, 
and therefore they might seek to rebalance their portfolios in such a way that they held 
more equities and foreign assets, and held less interest-bearing assets, when they 
received further liquidity from the BOJ. In addition, the result that the response of 
interest rates is larger at the longer end of maturities implies that investors intended to 
sell more long-term interest-bearing assets than short-term assets, because of the 
concern about rises in the future interest rates. 
Our findings with regard to the effect of the QMEP on financial markets seem to be 
different from Kimura and Small (2004) and Oda and Ueda (2005). Kimura and Small 
(2004) obtain the result that the QMEP raised stock returns (lowered stock prices) 
through the portfolio-rebalancing effect. However, they measure only the one-day 
                                                                                                                                                  
example, if the 2005-base CPI had been available to the BOJ in March 2006, the QMEP 
would not have been terminated in this month). 
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response of stock returns (prices) to the policy change. Furthermore, they do not control 
for the effect of macroeconomic variables on the stock market. Oda and Ueda (2005) find 
that the expansion of the CABs lowered medium- to long-term interest rates through 
the signaling effect. To decompose nominal interest rates into expectations and risk 
premium components, they use a macrofinance approach in which a macroeconomic 
model consists of the backward-looking versions of aggregate demand function, 
aggregate supply function, and monetary policy rule. However, this simple and 
restricted model may not be appropriate to describe the Japanese economy for the 
QMEP period. 
[Figure 4 around here] 
We have found that it is better to include stock prices in the VAR model to capture the 
dynamics of the Japanese economy for the QMEP period. Figure 4 displays all impulse 
response functions for the four-variable VAR, which consists of IIP, core CPI, the CAB 
target, and stock prices. Interestingly, IIP shows a slower response than the stock price 
response: in response to a quantitative-easing shock, IIP begins to increase from the 
second month and peaks at the ninth month, while stock prices begin to rise from the 
first month and peak at the sixth month. This result suggests that there exists the stock 
price channel for the QMEP period. There are four possible channels through which 
higher stock prices boost the output level: an increase in consumption through a rise in 
households’ wealth (the wealth effect); an increase in investment through higher Tobin’s 
q; an increase in bank lending through a decline in the external finance premium of 
borrowers (the balance sheet effect); and an increase in bank lending through an 
improvement in the banks' capital-to-asset ratios. Considering the result that a 
quantitative-easing shock does not increase bank lending (see Chart L in Figure 3), we 
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suppose that the last two channels were very weak and either or both of the first two 
channels mainly worked in the QMEP period. 
There are three other remarkable findings in Figure 4. First, a quantitative-easing 
shock raises core CPI, but the response is very small and insignificant throughout the 
period as with the case of the three-variable VAR, suggesting that the QMEP had little 
effect on the price level. Second, the CAB target increases (decreases) not only in 
response to a negative (positive) core CPI shock but also in response to a negative 
(positive) stock price shock. Third, a positive shock to stock prices raises IIP with the 
statistical significance in the second and third months.  
[Table 2 around here] 
Next, we conduct the variance decomposition analysis. Table 2 reports the results for 
the four-variable VAR with stock prices included. The value in the table denotes the 
percentage of the variance of the 2-, 6-, and 12-months-ahead forecast errors that are 
accounted for by monetary policy shocks. The standard errors, computed by Monte 
Carlo simulation with 500 repetitions, are reported in parentheses. Monetary policy 
shocks account for a significant part of the volatility of IIP and stock prices (41% and 
46% of the 12-months-ahead forecast error variance of IIP and stock prices, 
respectively). On the other hand, monetary policy shocks account for only a small part of 
the volatility of core CPI (only 7% of the 12-months-ahead forecast error variance of core 
CPI). Thus, monetary policy shocks are a major contributor to fluctuations of aggregate 
output and stock prices, but they are unimportant for explaining the fluctuation of 
general prices. 
[Table 3 around here] 
Finally, we perform the Granger causality test. Table 3 reports the results of the 
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Granger causality test (F-test) for the four-variable VAR including stock prices. The left 
column presents p-values associated with the test of the null hypothesis that the CAB 
target does not Granger-cause IIP, core CPI, and stock prices. The right column provides 
p-values for the test of the null hypothesis that stock prices do not Granger-cause IIP, 
core CPI, and the CAB target. In the left column, the null hypothesis that the CAB 
target does not Granger-cause stock prices can be rejected at the 1% significance level, 
suggesting that there is a Granger-causality from the CAB target to stock prices. In the 
right column, the null hypothesis that stock prices do not Granger-cause IIP can be 
rejected at the 6% significance level, suggesting that there is a Granger-causality from 
stock prices to IIP. Therefore, the results of the Granger causality test complement 
evidence of the stock price channel found from the estimated impulse response 
functions. 
 
5. Alternative Specifications 
5.1. Controlling for the Effects of Alternative Policy Tools 
In the QMEP period the BOJ conducted two unconventional policies other than 
expanding the CABs. One is the increases in the outright purchase of long-term 
government bonds (OPLTGBs). The target amount of the OPLTGBs per month was 
gradually increased from 400 billion yen to 600 billion yen in August 2001, to 800 billion 
yen in December 2001, to 1 trillion yen in February 2002, and to 1.2 trillion yen in 
October 2002. The other policy is the purchase of stocks held by commercial banks. This 
policy was conducted from November 2002 to September 2004, and the value of 
purchased stocks amounted to about 2 trillion yen in September 2004. According to the 
public announcement, the BOJ did not aim to stimulate economic activity directly by 
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introducing these two policies. In fact, the BOJ expanded the amount of the OPLTGBs 
to achieve the increased CAB target smoothly. The BOJ also began to purchase the 
stocks held by commercial banks to reduce the risk pertaining to the shareholdings of 
the banks, who suffered from the serious NPL problem. However, in spite of such BOJ’s 
intentions, these two policies might have effects on output, prices or stock prices, 
independent of the increases in the CAB target. Thus, in this subsection, we control for 
such possible effects so as to check the robustness of our results obtained in the previous 
section. 
[Figure 5 around here] 
To this end, either the target amount of the OPLTGBs or the total amount of the 
purchased stocks (both transformed in logarithm and multiplied by 100) is added to the 
four-variable VAR with stock prices.17 In each VAR model, an additional variable of the 
alternative policy measure is ordered just after the CAB target. Column (A) in Figure 5 
displays the dynamic responses of the VAR variables to a quantitative-easing shock for 
the five-variable VAR model, which consists of IIP, core CPI, the CAB target, stock 
prices, and the OPLTGB target. We find that the shapes of the impulse response 
functions do not change compared with those in the third column in Figure 4, and that 
there is still evidence of the stock price channel. Column (B) in Figure 5 displays the 
corresponding results for the five-variable VAR in which the OPLTGB target is replaced 
by the total amount of the purchased stocks. Inclusion of the purchased stocks appears 
to change the shapes somewhat of the impulse response functions. In particular, the 
positive responses of IIP and stock prices become much smaller. Nevertheless, they are 
                                                  
17 The BOJ reports the total amount of the purchased stocks for the period from 
December 2002 to September 2004. We set its values before this period equal to zero (in 
logarithm). We also set the values after this period equal to the value in September 
2004, because the BOJ did not sell the stocks during the QMEP period. 
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statistically different from zero for some periods, and stock prices show an earlier 
response than IIP. Therefore, we can still see evidence of the stock price channel even in 
this case.18,19 
 
5.2. Controlling for the Effects of Alternative Contributors to Economic Recovery 
The recent economic recovery in Japan seems to be attributable not only to the QMEP 
of the BOJ but also to the following two alternative factors: the large increases in the 
values of exports due to strong overseas economy; and the large decreases in the 
outstanding amount of NPLs of the banking sector. In this subsection, we control for the 
possible effects of these two factors to check the robustness of our results. For this 
purpose, we add to the four-variable VAR with stock prices either the export values or 
the outstanding amount of NPLs (both transformed in logarithm and multiplied by 
100).20 The measure of exports is ordered first since it depends on foreign economic 
activities (that is, treated as most exogenous), and the measure of the outstanding 
amount of NPLs is ordered last since it is a financial sector variable (that is, treated as 
most endogenous). 
[Figure 6 around here] 
Column (A) in Figure 6 displays the dynamic responses of the VAR variables to a 
                                                  
18 With regard to the impacts of these two alternative policy measures on output, prices, 
and stock prices, we could not find clear evidence indicating the presence of their effects. 
19 To save space, here we do not report the results of the variance decomposition and the 
Granger causality test in table form. However, these results support the existence of the 
stock price channel for both five-variable VARs: in the variance decomposition analysis, 
monetary policy shocks account for at least more than 20% of the 12-months-ahead 
forecast error variance of IIP and stock prices; in the Granger causality test, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the CAB target does not Granger-cause stock prices and 
also reject the null hypothesis that stock prices do not Granger-cause IIP at 
conventional significance levels. 
20 Since the NPL data are only available for end-March and end-September in each year, 
we use the interpolation method to construct the monthly data of NPLs. 
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quantitative-easing shock for the five-variable VAR with exports included, and column 
(B) displays the corresponding results for the five-variable VAR with NPLs included. 
The estimated impulse response functions are somewhat different from the third 
column in Figure 4: in column (A), the response of core CPI is larger and the response of 
stock prices is more persistent; and in column (B), the responses of IIP, core CPI, and 
stock prices are smaller. However, for both VAR specifications, the positive responses of 
IIP and stock prices are statistically different from zero for some periods and stock 
prices exhibit an earlier response than IIP. Therefore, we can still see evidence of the 
stock price channel even if we control for the effects of exports and NPLs.21  
There are two other interesting findings from Figure 6. First, in column (A), a 
quantitative-easing shock increases exports persistently (but the response is not 
statistically significant throughout the period, except for the first month after a policy 
shock). As seen in Chart K of Figure 3, a quantitative-easing shock depreciates the yen 
(but the depreciation is also insignificant). Therefore, the QMEP might be effective 
through the exchange rate channel, though the evidence is not strong enough to be 
supported statistically.22 Second, in column (B) a quantitative-easing shock generates 
persistent declines in NPLs (but the response is insignificant throughout the period). 
Interestingly, the negative response of NPLs appears to be slower than the IIP response, 
suggesting that the QMEP contributed to the decreases in NPLs by boosting the Japan’s 
real economy.  
                                                  
21 The results of the variance decomposition and the Granger causality test also 
support the presence of the stock price channel, except for one case (the null hypothesis 
that stock prices do not Granger-cause IIP cannot be rejected even at the 10% 
significance level for the five-variable VAR with exports). 
22 Even when the exchange rate was added to this five-variable VAR, we obtained 
results suggesting the existence of the exchange rate channel (but the evidence is not 
strong enough to be supported statistically).  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Many macroeconomists and policymakers have discussed whether the further 
injection of monetary base at zero interest rates is effective. This paper has addressed 
this issue by examining the effect of the QMEP implemented in Japan. Using the VAR 
approach, we have found that the QMEP stimulated real economic activity through the 
stock price channel: in the impulse response function analysis, a quantitative-easing 
shock firstly raises stock prices and then increases the output level; in the variance 
decomposition analysis, monetary policy shocks account for a significant part of the 
volatility of output and stock prices; and in the Granger causality test, the target level 
of the CABs Granger-causes stock prices, and stock prices in turn Granger-cause the 
output level. All of the above results suggest the existence of the stock price channel. We 
have also found that evidence of the stock price channel is robust, even if we control for 
the effects of two alternative policies of the BOJ (the increases in the outright purchase 
of long-term government bonds and the introduction of the purchase of stocks held by 
commercial banks) and even if we control for the effects of two alternative contributors 
to recent economic recovery (the large increases in exports and the large declines in 
NPLs). 
In the standard IS-LM model, an injection of base money has no effect under the 
condition of liquidity trap. Our empirical evidence agrees with this liquidity trap 
hypothesis in that we find no liquidity effect on nominal interest rates. However, we 
have also found that an injection of base money at zero interest rates has significant 
effect on aggregate output through the stock price channel. This finding suggests that 
the IS-LM model, which considers only two assets of money and bonds, is oversimplified 
to capture the real economic world at least in the recent Japanese case. Brunner and 
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Meltzer (1963) and Tobin (1969) suggested various channels of policy shocks based on 
multiasset models. Our empirical findings are consistent with the thinking of these 
classic articles. 
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Data Appendix 
Variable Description Source 
IIP Seasonally adjusted series, 
2000 average = 100 
Website of Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry 
Core CPI Seasonally adjusted series, 
2000 average = 100 
Website of Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications 
LIBOR Rates 
(1, 3, 6, 12 months) 
JPY, end of month Website of British Bankers’ 
Association 
Swap rates 
(2, 3, 5, 7, 10 years) 
Yen–yen, average of offered and 
bid rates, end of month 
NEEDS Financial QUEST 
Nikkei Stock Average  End of month Website of BOJ 
Real effective exchange rate March 1973 = 100 Website of BOJ 
Bank lending  Loans and discounts of banks, 
seasonally adjusted by using 
Census X-12 
Website of BOJ 
BOJ’s stock purchases Total amount of purchased stocks 
reported in BOJ’s accounts, end of 
month 
Website of BOJ 
Exports Balance of payments, seasonally 
adjusted series 
Website of Ministry of Finance 
NPLs Based on the definition in the 
Financial Reconstruction Law, all 
banks 
Website of Financial Services 
Agency 
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Table 1 
Policy Changes during the QMEP Period 
Dates of policy changes 
Announced targets of the CABs 
(trillion yen) 
Values of the CAB target variable 
(trillion yen) 
19 March 2001 Introduction of QMEP  
19 March 2001 5 5 (March 2001 to July 2001) 
14 August 2001 6 6 (August 2001) 
18 September 2001 Above 6 8 (September 2001), 8.7 (October 2001), 9.3 (November 2001)
19 December 2001 10–15 12.5 (December 2001 to September 2002) 
30 October 2002 15–20 17.5 (October 2002 to March 2003) 
30 April 2003 22–27 24.5 (April 2003) 
20 May 2003 27–30 28.5 (May 2003 to September 2003) 
10 October 2003 27–32 29.5 (October 2003 to December 2003) 
20 January 2004 30–35 32.5 (January 2004 to February 2006) 
9 March 2006 Termination of QMEP  
On 1 April 2003, the BOJ raised the CAB target to 17–22 trillion yen for necessary adjustment due to the 
establishment of the Japan Post. 
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Table 2 
Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Explained by Monetary Policy Shock 
 Period 
Variable 2 6 12 
IIP 1.14 (2.71) 16.48 (10.82) 40.89 (16.11) 
Core CPI 3.75 (4.65) 2.79 (5.82) 6.67 (9.39) 
CAB target 97.38 (6.06) 86.91 (11.53) 61.20 (17.40) 
Stock prices 10.51 (8.42) 34.40 (13.19) 45.59 (14.34) 
The table reports the percentage of the variance of the 2-, 6-, and 12-months-ahead forecast errors in 
IIP, core CPI, the CAB target, and stock prices that are accounted for by monetary policy shocks. The 
variance decomposition is conducted for the four-variable VAR, consisting of IIP, core CPI, the CAB 
target, and stock prices. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
P-value for Granger Causality Test 
From CAB target to: From stock prices to: 
IIP 0.21 IIP 0.05 
Core CPI 0.06 Core CPI 0.24 
Stock prices < 0.01 CAB target 0.39 
The table reports p-values for the Granger causality test. The test is performed for the four-variable 
VAR, consisting of IIP, core CPI, the CAB target, and stock prices. The left column presents p-values 
for the test of the null hypothesis that the CAB target does not Granger-cause IIP, core CPI, and stock 
prices. The right column presents p-values for the test of the null hypothesis that stock prices do not 
Granger-cause IIP, core CPI, and the CAB target. 
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Figure 1 
Time Series Data 
 
The figure displays the time series of the data used in the estimation. The vertical lines indicate the 
months when the BOJ changed the CAB target. 
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Figure 2 
Impulse Response Functions for the Three-variable VAR 
 
The figure displays the estimated impulse response functions for the three-variable VAR, consisting 
of IIP, core CPI, and the CAB target. The dotted lines denote two-standard-error bands. 
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Figure 3 
Effects of Quantitative Easing Shocks on Financial Variables 
 
Each chart displays the dynamic effects of a quantitative easing shock on a financial variable. The 
impulse response function is estimated from the four-variable VAR, consisting of IIP, core CPI, the 
CAB target, and a financial variable. Financial variables used include nominal interest rates with 
various maturities, stock prices, foreign exchange rates, and bank lending. The dotted lines denote 
two-standard-error bands. 
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Figure 4 
Impulse Response Functions for the Four-variable VAR 
 
The figure displays the estimated impulse response functions for the four-variable VAR, consisting of 
IIP, core CPI, the CAB target, and stock prices. The dotted lines denote two-standard-error bands. 
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Figure 5 
Effects of Quantitative Easing Shocks with Two Alternative Policy Measures Included 
 
Column (A) displays the dynamic effects of a quantitative easing shock estimated from the 
five-variable VAR, consisting of IIP, core CPI, the CAB target, stock prices, and the OPLTGB target. 
Column (B) displays those estimated from the five-variable VAR, consisting of IIP, core CPI, the CAB 
target, stock prices, and BOJ’s stock purchases. The dotted lines denote two-standard-error bands. 
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Figure 6 
Effects of Quantitative Easing Shocks with Exports and NPLs Included 
 
Column (A) displays the dynamic effects of a quantitative easing shock estimated from the 
five-variable VAR, consisting of IIP, core CPI, the CAB target, stock prices, and exports. Column (B) 
displays those estimated from the five-variable VAR, consisting of IIP, core CPI, the CAB target, stock 
prices, and NPLs. The dotted lines denote two-standard-error bands.   
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